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Abstract In the first two sections of this reply article, I provide a brief introduction to
the topic of ineffability and a summary of Ineffability and Religious Experience. This
is followed, in section 3, by some reflections in reply to the response articles by
Professors Metz and Cooper. Section 4 presents some concluding remarks on the future
of philosophy of religion in the light of the most recent philosophical work on
ineffability.
Keywords David E. Cooper . Ineffability . Meaning .Meaning of life .Mystery .
Philosophy of religion . ThaddeusMetz
1 Introduction
The concept of ineffability, which I define in terms of what is in principle resistant to
conceptual grasp and literal linguistic articulation, has been an abiding presence in
human thought for millennia. Yet this evanescent topic has been badly neglected by
contemporary philosophy, whose focus has, for far too long, been on linguistic forms in
isolation from the rest of life. The twentieth century saw the publication of a few
important papers on ineffability in philosophy of religion (Alston 1956; Hick 2000).
But it is only recently that renewed, sustained philosophical attention has been turned to
ineffability per se (e.g., Cooper 2002; Bennett-Hunter 2014; Jonas 2016). This recent
revival of interest is salutary, especially given the long history of this difficult topic. But
some brief remarks on that history, whose context is chiefly religious thought, will
make clear the profoundly ambiguous position that the concept of ineffability has
continued to occupy.
The idea of ineffability has been at work in religious thought for many centuries,
including the Christian tradition, with which I am most familiar—and by which my
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writers who, as Anthony Kenny points out, predicated their approach to theology on the
concept of ineffability. Kenny (2006, 443) writes:
In centuries past theologians of unquestioned devoutness have maintained that
God was ineffable, and indeed inconceivable. We humans, they maintained,
cannot speak appropriately about God, and we cannot even think coherently
about him. In a quite strict sense, it is impossible to use words about God. God is
not something to be captured by human language.
However, writers in this vein, referred to as ‘apophatic’ or ‘negative’ theologians,
have not always been of unquestioned devoutness. Indeed, two of the most influential
examples, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (fl. c. 650–c. 725 CE) and Meister Eckhart
(1260–1328), took up their positions at the fringes of Christian orthodoxy. Although
they lived in very different historical periods (one in the classical world, the other in the
medieval) both were influenced by neo-Platonism and both were regarded as heretical
at some point in Christian history: Eckhart was condemned during his lifetime by the
Roman Catholic Church, and Pseudo-Dionysius’s writings were regarded as orthodox
until the fifteenth or sixteenth century. As Leszek Kołakowski (1988, 49) explains,
regarding pseudo-Dionysius:
if the author of On Divine Names had not been mistaken for centuries for whom
be pretended to be—the first Bishop of Athens converted by St Paul (Acts,
17.54)—he most probably would not have got away with his brazen neo-
Platonism and his work would have remained in the annals of Christian though[t]
as a heretical freak.
So despite its persistent centrality to religious thought, the concept of ineffability has
always struggled to gain mainstream acceptance—a situation which persists in con-
temporary theology and philosophy of religion.
In an important article, which provides the first published description of the archived
papers of the famous British philosopher of religion, John Hick, Thomas William
Ruston (2016) provides evidence that, at least since 1940, Hick had been consistently
interested, throughout his philosophical career, in the idea of an ineffable ultimate
reality transcending all human categories, which he called ‘the Real’ or the
‘Transcategorial’. Interestingly, Ruston traces Hick’s source for the idea back to
Spinoza, who was not exactly persona grata in theological circles. Ruston quotes a
letter from the archives written by Hick’s friend and fellow philosopher, Peter Heath,
who feared that, although Hick’s concept of ineffability appeared to open up a
philosophical route to religious pluralism, his view would never gain widespread
theological acceptance, and would even cause an ‘outcry’ against him.
There was certainly some precedent for such a fear, as Ruston (2016, 12, 13,
14–18) illustrates by describing two biographical episodes. In 1962, while at
Princeton, Hick was put on ‘trial for heresy’ by the Presbyterian Church in the
USA (of which he was also an ordained minister) and, in 1996, was criticized in a
public address by Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI—then Cardinal Ratzinger. The
first critique was widely known about and was even reported in the New York
Times. And Pope Benedict’s critique determined the official position of the Roman
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Catholic Church on religious pluralism in general, even though, as Ruston’s article
shows, his exposition of Hick was based on inaccurate scholarship. The substance of
Pope Benedict’s complaint was that Hick’s concept of ineffability ruled out the exclusive
truth of any human representation of the divine. But, as Ruston demonstrates, Hick’s
view was that this simply follows from the view of divine ineffability that had been
affirmed by mainstream, ‘orthodox’ theologians, including Gregory of Nyssa,
Augustine, and Aquinas, as well as Pseudo-Dionysius, whose position, as we have seen,
was less straightforward. But, despite the centrality of ineffability to the Christian
tradition (as well as other religious traditions), the concept’s theological implications
are still regarded as deeply ambiguous (Bennett-Hunter 2016b).
While some contemporary theologians and philosophers of religion pay lip service
to ineffability (perhaps on account of its centrality to the work of the unquestionedly
devout), most of them (unlike Hick) have been reluctant to follow through its logical
implications for religion and theology. While they are happy to give formal assent to
the idea of divine ineffability, such religious thinkers also invariably insist, for example,
that ‘there are also reasons to think that the divine, the inner nature of which is
linguistically inexpressible and incommunicable, makes itself known, however analog-
ically, in ways that humans can partly comprehend’ (Ward 2016). However, when they
are pressed on just what these reasons are, they tend, at best, to fall back on appeals to
divine revelation, which, as Freud (2004, 31–2) pointed out, rely on circular reasoning.
As I argue in my book (Bennett-Hunter 2014, 10–12 cf. Boyer 2007), even the most
valiant philosophical attempts to analyse and defend the logic of this position are
fundamentally confused. The main problem with such attempts, as I say, is that they
fail to observe the crucial distinction between what is ineffable in principle (and of
philosophical interest) and that which is so merely in practice, in a purely trivial sense.
It is against this turbulent background that Ineffability and Religious Experience
endorses and develops David E. Cooper’s recent philosophical defence of the concept
of ineffability per se and applies it systematically in philosophy of religion.
2 Précis of Ineffability and Religious Experience
As Professor Cooper (2016, 000) points out in his article, there is a philosophical
problem of ineffability that the book addresses: the tension between ineffability and
answerability (Bennett-Hunter 2014, 14). This is the tension between the work that the
concept of ineffability is required to do in order to be worth invoking and the concept
itself. It is problematic to affirm a strong concept of the ineffable in principle and also to
insist that there are ways in which human beings are answerable to the ineffable. While
this tension exists in any appeal to the concept of ineffability, it is felt particularly
keenly in religious contexts. As the theologian Brown (2008, 22) puts it, it is a tension
that ‘exists in almost all forms of religion … that between explanation and mystery,
between the conviction that something has been communicated by the divine
(revelation) and the feeling that none the less God is infinitely beyond all our imagin-
ings’. Indeed, this tension can be seen to be at work in the ongoing theological
reluctance, just observed, to follow through ineffability’s logical implications.
To resolve this tension, I endorse Cooper’s recent argument for ineffability. The
phenomenological background to his argument owes to ‘the thesis of the human
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world’: the humanistic view that any conceptualizable or articulable (i.e., ‘discursable’)
world is a human world. He writes:
any world—physical and/or divine—that we could articulate and conceptualize is
a ‘human world’: one that is the way it is only in relation to human perspective,
purpose and preference, and not one, therefore, which is that way ‘in itself’ or
‘anyway’ independently of such human factors (Cooper 2005, 132).
But he views such humanism as impossibly raw and hubristic since it erroneously
attributes to human beings the capacity to live with the sense that none of our concepts,
values, beliefs, and commitments are answerable to anything beyond themselves, since
there is nothing ‘beyond the human’. If we really believed this, Cooper argues, it could
not have mattered to us if the concepts and meanings with which we invest the world,
and the commitments and decisions that we happen to have made, had been different.
This amounts to the belief that nothing is more or less worth believing or doing than
anything else, a nihilistic belief with which Cooper does not think it genuinely possible
to live. The fact that most of us do carry on with our lives as normal suggests that
experience is not usually structured in this way. An apparent impasse results from the
rejection of both ‘absolutism’ (the view that there is a discursable way the world is
independently of the human contribution) and ‘uncompensated humanism’ (the view
that there is nothing beyond the human which could provide measure for our lives).
Cooper finds the resolution in an appeal to ineffability: the thought that ‘there is a way
the world anyway and independently is, but that this way is not discursable’, in my
terms, that ultimate reality is ineffable. According to this thought, Cooper (2009, 54)
writes:
Absolutists … are right to insist that reality is independent of the human
contribution, but wrong to suppose that this reality can be articulated. Humanists,
correspondingly, are right to maintain that any discursable world is a human one,
but wrong to equate reality with this world.
So the concept of ineffability involved is of a reality beyond the human that is, for
that reason and in principle, ‘undiscursable’: unconceptualizable and literally
inarticulable. This concept plays the strategic role of compensating for the humanist
thesis without abandoning it, of providing measure for human Life:1 something beyond
itself to which that Life can answer.
The argument thus far can be summarized in terms of the answer to a question
regarding the meaning of Life. If the meanings of things, the concepts and values
with which we invest them, must be explained in terms of their contribution to
human concerns, practices, and projects—and therefore ultimately in terms of their
relation of appropriateness to the human perspective, the world of human Life to
which those practices and concerns themselves contribute—how can Life itself
and as a whole be said to have meaning? The answer is: only by placing it in a
relation of appropriateness to what is beyond itself, independent of the human
1 Cooper’s capitalization, which I adopt here, is intended both to convey Dilthey’s sense of das Leben as the
‘permanent subject’ of meaning and to rule out purely biological senses (Cooper 2005, 126).
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contribution and therefore ultimately real. This ‘beyond’ cannot, without circular-
ity, be invested with the concepts and meanings that constitute Life—which it is
invoked to explain—therefore it must be ineffable.
But Cooper points out that, although it would abrogate the ineffability of ultimate
reality to try to speak about it in literal terms, some kind of intimation of or attunement
to it is required, to underwrite the view that certain ways of living are answerable to the
way of things. He thinks that this requirement can be fulfilled by non-literal forms of
language, ‘rhetorics’ and ‘poetries’ of ineffability found in the texts of various philo-
sophical and religious traditions, which gesture towards what he calls ‘a sense or vision
of the mysterious’ (Cooper 2009, 55). However, a very important point is that the
requisite language does not encourage a disjunctive or dualistic vision of the relation of
ineffable ultimate reality to the human world. Although the former must be thought of
as ineffable and independent of the human perspective in order adequately to provide
measure for it, it would be wrong to visualize it as disjoined from that world. In that
case, we would be too prone to envisage the ineffable in absolutist terms, for example,
as a transcendent Kantian realm or a thing, like a cosmos or (for Cooper) a god: no less
discursable than the human world itself because invested with (at least some of) the
very concepts and meanings for which it was supposed to provide measure—precisely
by not being so invested.
John Hick’s (2000, 40) neo-Kantian vision of the ineffable (which he sometimes
refers to in religious terms) as a ‘joint product of [the divine] presence and our own
conceptual systems and their associated spiritual practices’ falls into this error and,
from Cooper’s viewpoint, is incoherent. For, as Cooper points out, it allows a very
major exception to the general claim that the world depends for what it is on human
beings (for example, on the a priori structures of the mind), and that is human existence
itself. The question is then raised, what place we ourselves could have in such a world,
so much of our own making. This view requires us, impossibly, to be, ‘so to speak,…
already there, up and running, … responsible for the world taking on the contours it
does’ (Cooper 2005, 134).
So Cooper’s solution is a non-literal vocabulary that encourages a vision of intimacy
between the human world and its ineffable measure or ‘source’: a transformed attitude
of attunement towards the human world itself. Following the vocabulary of the later
Heidegger, he suggests that we should think of the human world as the ‘epiphanizing’
or ‘presencing’ of ultimate reality—as a mysterious ‘gift’. ‘This world,’ as Cooper
(2009, 58) writes, ‘is not simply a human world unthinkable in isolation from us, but at
the same time a realization of, a coming forth of, something to which we can strive to
answer and measure up.’ His argument for the ineffability of ultimate reality, then, is
intended to provide a kind of answer to the question of the meaning of Life. Its
existential phenomenological approach, which differently construes the nature of the
relationship between human beings and the world (and between the human world and
its ineffable ‘measure’), allows it to answer this question in a way that resolves the
tension between ineffability and answerability—which, my view, also provides a way
of surmounting the main obstacle to making sense of ineffability in philosophy of
religion: the problem of the possibility of experiencing an ineffable God.
In response to the question how it is possible to secure reference to what is in
principle ineffable, I respond that the distinction is observed between language that
talks about things and that which talks about language. I suggest that the word ‘God’ is
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understood in parallel to other philosophical terms like ‘ultimate reality’, ‘the absolute’,
‘Being’, and ‘Transcendence’ to refer to the concept of ineffability and thereby to evoke
(but obviously not refer to, describe, or express) the ineffable. While Cooper is reluctant
to use theistic terminology when invoking his notion of ineffability, the language of
divinity and its associated ritual practices may turn out to be particularly effective
means of evoking the transparency that Cooper mentions of the human world to its
ineffable measure. The word ‘God’ and its cognates are already used by many religious
people to evoke what is ultimately real, is appealed to in religious explanations of the
meaning of human life, and which religious practices properly intend. Indeed, Martin
Buber recounts a conversation in which a friend suggested to him that it seems almost
blasphemous to use the word ‘God’ for the highest ultimate reality, because that reality
is thereby lowered to human conceptualization. Buber responded that the word can be
so evocative precisely because it has become so ‘soiled’ and ‘mutilated’. He writes,
‘Just for this reason I may not abandon it. Generations of [women and] men have laid
the burden of their anxious lives upon this word and weighed it to the ground; it lies in
the dust and bears their whole burden.…Where might I find a word like it to describe
the highest!’ (Buber 1953, 16–17). Admittedly, many religious uses of ‘God’ carry
what John Cottingham (2006) calls ‘doxastic freight’: literally understood, their content
looks incompatible with the concept of ineffability. But apophatic theologians have, for
centuries, been treating that freight as just so much ballast to be jettisoned. Language is
dynamic and continuously subject to interpretation and reinterpretation. It is therefore
surely mistaken to assume that all uses of the language of divinity—and still less all
religious practices—necessarily imply concepts and attitudes that are incompatible with
the concept of ineffability, as they often do on a purely literal interpretation.
On the basis of considerations such as these, the last three chapters of my book apply
Cooper’s philosophical approach to ineffability in the context of philosophy of religion,
developing a new philosophical account of divine ineffability, which also draws on the
unjustly neglected philosophy of Karl Jaspers. While it will be impossible to describe
this account fully in the space available, in what follows, I draw attention to the
theological implications of the concept of ineffability that are of most relevance to
the response articles by Metz and Cooper.
In order to avoid the familiar self-reference antinomy apparently involved in inef-
fability claims (see, e.g., Kołakowski 1988, 44), I suggest that the word ‘God’ be
understood as a religious reference (alongside parallel philosophical terms), not to the
ineffable but to the concept of ineffability. These terms thereby evoke, but obviously do
not describe or express, the ineffable. An important implication, as just intimated, is
that ontotheology (the idea that the word ‘God’ refers to something that exists, in the
same way that objects or we ourselves exist) should be rejected. ‘God’ can be
understood to refer to the concept of what explains the meanings and concepts of the
human world, and therefore the meaning of human Life, only by not being invested
with those concepts and meanings. And, from the perspectives of phenomenology and
contemporary pragmatism by which I am influenced here, the concept of existence
must be included among these. From the phenomenological perspective, Kołakowski
(1975, 65) reads Husserl as follows:
BExistence^ itself is a certain Bsense^ of an object. Consequently it would be
absurd… to say that an object Bexists^ independently of the meaning of the word
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Bto exist^—independently of the act of constitution performed by the
consciousness.
As the Finnish pragmatist philosopher, Sami Pihlström (1996, 123) puts it, ‘Words
like Bobject^ and Bexists^ are used in different ways in different contexts (or language-
games). No usage is Bforced^ by the world.’ AndWilliam James (1922, 242) makes the
point in broader terms: ‘to an unascertainable extent,’ he writes, ‘our truths are man-
made products’. For all three thinkers, the human world is shaped and determined by
our human interests, perspectives, and practices—and, certainly for the first two, this
necessarily includes our most basic ontological categories.
If Cooper is correct, as I think he is, then the concept of ineffability is the only
concept that one can appeal to in order to evoke the ultimately real and therefore
explain the meaning of life without circularity. And the denial that any concepts apply
to the ineffable, must extend to the concept of existence. In theological terms, if the
word ‘God’ is taken to refer to the concept of what accounts for the meaning of
everything that exists, it cannot also be thought of as referring to one of the things that
exist. Some twentieth-century and contemporary theologians who have intuited this
point have revisited the mystical tradition,2 carrying out thoroughgoing critiques of
ontotheology, in the light of which we can understand, for example, Meister Eckhart’s
refusal to mention ‘God’ and ‘existence’ in the same theological breath: Eckhart
controversially oscillated between the denial that God exists and the opposite claim
that only God exists. Such theologians have intuited an important theological implica-
tion of the concept of ineffability: that the word ‘God’ can be understood as a reference
to the concept of ineffable ultimate reality only if we give up the reassuring thought
that, in any familiar sense, ‘God exists’. We must either radically revise the concept of
existence (which seems otiose and otherwise unnecessary) or give up the idea that,
properly understood, the word ‘God’ refers to an entity. This theological line of thought
finds philosophical support in the phenomenological approach that has remained
relatively undeveloped in philosophy of religion in general.
A second implication is that, in order to contemplate the possibility of religious
experience after the rejection of ontotheology, we will have to be very clear just
what is meant by ‘experience’. I agree with Cooper (1985) that, at least in this
demesne, it is unreasonable to demand that ‘experience’ has to involve the
application of concepts, which would be incompatible with ineffability; I agree
that the distinction between subjective and objective dimensions to the notion of
experience may be ‘badly drawn’; and I also agree with phenomenological and
pragmatist critiques—notably, John Dewey’s (1949, 187)—of the dualistic con-
strual of the subject-object distinction as a dichotomy, which renders the potential
relationship between the distinguished items unintelligible. With regard to the
concept of experience, such a dualistic understanding entails the vagueness and
ambiguity in the phrase ‘what I experienced’, which could refer equally to the
object of an experience as to the experience itself. So, in order to understand the
nature of religious experience in the light of divine ineffability, we have to
consider a very different understanding of experience: one that does not require
2 Some well-known twentieth-century examples include Paul Tillich (1968 vol. 1, 227, 262–3, 301), Simone
Weil (for a sympathetic contemporary account, see Williams (2007)), and John Macquarrie (1984, 186).
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the application of concepts nor a dualistic distinction between its subjective and
objective dimensions.
While some theologians who are sympathetic to divine ineffability have tried to
account for religious experience (and expression) in symbolic terms, I argue in my
book that this concept of symbol ends up reinforcing an unhelpful dichotomy
between subject and object (Bennett-Hunter 2014, 67–75). I find an alternative,
and more congenial, concept to be Karl Jaspers’s ‘ciphers [Chiffren]’. Whereas
symbols are typically understood as objective realities that intend other realities
(whether or not they exist outside the symbol) and objectify them in the symbolic
representation, ciphers, for Jaspers, are irreducible to either pole of the distinction.
They are understood as subjective and objective at once and hence like the
‘language’ or ‘physiognomy’ of the ineffable reality that can be experienced only
in and through the cipher. Therefore, while a symbol can only symbolize some-
thing within the subject–object distinction, a cipher can embody what Jaspers calls
‘Transcendence or God’, by which he means the ineffable ultimate reality that is
unconditioned by that distinction—and, from my anti-ontotheological perspective,
is certainly irreducible to its objective pole. Although I take issue with some of the
detail of Jaspers’s account of ciphers (especially in the context of his complex and
monumental philosophical system as a whole), I argue in my book that, on this
basis, religious experience should be interpreted as the experience of religious
ciphers: parts of the (natural or cultural) human world that are experienced as
transparent to, or intimate with, the ineffable, divine source of that intractably
meaningful world. And although I cannot go into this in any detail here, I also
think that religious expression should be interpreted, in the light of divine ineffa-
bility, as a set of linguistic and non-linguistic practices that both reflect and bring
about this kind of experiential attunement of oneself and others to the ineffable. I
argue for four parallels between religious and aesthetic expression, drawing on the
phenomenology of art and the later Wittgenstein, to make the case that, after the
rejection of ontotheology, religious language and ritual practices are not best
understood as obviously bad attempts to describe the ‘religious object’ experi-
enced (a notion which begins to look incoherent from my anti-ontotheological
point of view) but rather as evocations of what cannot be described: through the
way in which a story is told and the manner in which a ritual is performed, rather
than primarily through their cognitive content (Bennett-Hunter 2014, 133–148).
Here, I expand briefly on my account of religious ciphers by contrasting it with
the religious pluralism for which John Hick became notorious. For Hick, religious
pluralism follows from divine ineffability because of the Kantian distinction that (as
we saw earlier) he applies in the religious demesne between the ineffable, noumenal
Real an sich and its phenomenal appearances to human perceivers. Since the latter
vary from religion to religion, Hick concludes a principle of equal validity between
the world’s religions: the idea, as he puts it, ‘that human religious experience is a
range of responses to a transcendent reality, taken together with the observation that
the moral and spiritual fruits of the different world faiths are, so far as we can tell,
equally valuable’ (Hick 2000, 41). I have already explained my reasons for finding
Hick’s neo-Kantian perspective on ineffability questionable. But, in a religious
context, the necessary rejection of ontotheology further problematizes Hick’s sharp
distinction between the noumenal, ineffable divine reality and its phenomenal
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appearances as well as his ultimately disjunctive vision of their relationship. Hick’s
pluralism acknowledges the formal differences between religions, which are ex-
plained in terms of differences in the Real’s phenomenal appearance in different
cultures and religions. But what makes religions equally valuable, in Hick’s view, is
their status as different responses to the same divine reality, experienced in corre-
spondingly different ways. For Hick, all religions are equally true, insofar as they
evoke, or respond to, the same ineffable, divine object. In my view, it is clear that
Hick has not followed the idea of divine ineffability to its logical conclusion: the
rejection of ontotheology. Hick’s God is still an object, invested with the concept of
existence, and therefore at least minimally conceptualizable. So I question whether
Hick is really committed to divine ineffability, in my sense.
My own position, by contrast, is based on a neo-Jaspersian view, according to
which religious experience is construed as a process of cipher-reading. Also
influenced by Kant, Karl Jaspers speaks of the ‘phenomenality’ of the human
world but denies that there is anything noumenal with which it might be
contrasted. Since, qua ineffable, ‘Transcendence or God’, is not an object, it is
discernible for us at all only in and through our reading of the cipher-script of that
phenomenal world itself. Just as a person’s being is perceptible in their ‘physiog-
nomy’ and ‘involuntary gestures’, Jaspers (1969a, vol. 3, 124–125) says, so we
experience the physiognomy, as it were, of all existence. Whereas human physi-
ognomy concerns the expression of something accessible in other ways (by
empirical psychology, for example), Transcendence is accessible only in and
through that ‘physiognomy’. Jaspers (1969a, vol. 3, 134) elaborates this transpar-
ent view of the phenomenal world:
This transparent view of existence is like a physiognomic viewing—but not like
the bad physiognomy aimed a form of knowledge, with inferences drawn, from
signs, on something underneath; it is like the true physiognomy whose ‘knowl-
edge’ is all in the viewing.
Rejecting the idea of any determinate reality to which the world becomes transpar-
ent, Jaspers (1967, 7) is clear that Transcendence or God is a boundary concept, rather
than an object, and that to our cognition, it indicates nothing beyond our imprisonment
in phenomenal appearance. But when we read the phenomenal world as a cipher-script
of Transcendence, he writes:
The phenomena in the dichotomy [der Spaltung] grow brighter. We sense the
encompassing [i.e., reality including its transcendent mode] in them. The prison
walls are not toppled… but if we know the prison, if we see it from the outside as
well, so to speak, the walls become transparent[, which…] makes the jail less and
less of a jail (Jaspers 1967, 79).
In common with Hick, this view of our being imprisoned in appearance implies that
no human perspective on reality (including religious ones) could ever be completely
and exclusively true. But it does not amount to Hick’s bolder, pluralistic claim that all
religions are equally true because they are apprehensions of the same noumenal object.
Considering the relationship between ciphers and religious traditions, Jaspers
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consistently denies that there can be a definitive system of ciphers, although he allows
that a system can itself be a cipher among others. He says:
From where I stand, the cipher remains permanently ambiguous—which means,
speaking from the standpoint of transcendence, that transcendence has other
ways yet to convey itself (Jaspers 1969a, vol. 3, 131).
So if we think, in Jaspersian terms, of religious systems as ciphers of Transcendence
or God, what matters is not the tradition’s concrete forms but the way in which these are
understood (or ‘read’) philosophically, which is why philosophy becomes an essential
companion, even prerequisite, to religion and theology from Jaspers’s point of view.
For example, if the religious system of Christianity were read as a cipher, its
Dogmas, sacraments, rituals would be melted down, so to speak—not destroyed,
but given other forms of conscious realization.… Not the substance, but the
appearance in consciousness would change. Philosophy and theology would be
on the road to reunification (Jaspers 1967, 340).
If Jaspers is right that any part of the world, or even the world as a whole, can become
transparent to the ineffable, a cipher of Transcendence, then no determinate meaning,
religious or non-religious, should in principle be debarred as a valid imagining or evocation
of the ineffable. In his view, what he calls the ‘poison’ of exclusive claims has to be
removed in order for religious experience to be ‘melted down’ into reading of a cipher:
Removing the poison consciously takes a simple and momentous insight: that
exact, generally valid truth is relative, dependent on premises and methods of
cognition but compelling for every intellect, while existential truth is historic,
absolute in each [person’s] life but not to be stated as valid for … all others
(Jaspers 1967, 340).
Rather than deserving the heated controversy that Hick faced, it should be recog-
nized that such an inclusive perspective (though far from Hick’s ‘pluralism’) follows
from the notion of divine ineffability, in the sense that this has been operative, in the
Christian tradition, since at least the sixth or seventh century CE. What will be most
important for the future of philosophy of religion is the kind of continuing conversation
that ineffability could make possible between members of different religious traditions,
both theistic and non-theistic — and, by extension, between religious people and
secular atheists. I return to the implications of this important point for further research
in the discipline in the final section of this article.
In summary, then, the main aim of Ineffability and Religious Experience is to situate
the phenomenology of religious phenomena, most importantly the various linguistic
and non-linguistic forms of religious praxis, within a philosophical framework to which
the concept of ineffability is central. This new philosophical theory of divine ineffa-
bility draws on Karl Jaspers’s philosophy to construe the experience of such religious
phenomena as a process of cipher-reading: a transformed attitude of attunement to parts
of the (natural or cultural) human world itself, or to that world as a whole. Such a
reading reveals the world’s total intimacy with its ‘ground’, ‘measure’, or ‘source’—
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one appropriate name for which is ‘God’. This theory implies the rejection of two
thoughts (1) the ontotheological idea that ‘God exists’ and (2) that any human
perspective on, or representation of, (divine) reality could be exhaustively or exclu-
sively true. Given the theological popularity of these two thoughts, the implications of
such a theory may be difficult for some theologians to accept, but no coherent way of
thinking about ineffability in a religious context is able to avoid these implications.
Moreover, as I started out by noting, despite its ubiquity, the concept of ineffability has
always struggled to gain mainstream theological acceptance.
3 Reply to Professors Metz and Cooper
3.1 Reply to Professor Metz
In his perceptive response article, Professor Metz correctly locates the foundations of
my project in a search for ultimate meaning—meaning (to repeat Nozick’s useful
phrase) ‘all the way down’. Metz rightly observes that I understand meaning in
relational terms. Following Cooper (2003, 2005), my view is that to explain the
meaning of something is to specify its relation of appropriateness to a context broader
than itself, ultimately to the context of human Life.3 I agree with Cooper’s (2005, 126)
initial definition of meaning as ‘appropriateness to Life’, and his appeal to ineffability
as enabling the only convincing answer to the question of the meaning of Life itself,
construed as the terminus of explanations of meaning or, to put it another way, the
source of ultimate meaning. But, in this connection, the most relevant implication of the
concept of ineffability is the fact that it shipwrecks the subject–object distinction. It
evokes a reality that is not an object that could possibly be comprehended by a subject
(cf. Heidegger 1962, 89), thereby demonstrating the limits of the subject–object
distinction and falsifying dualistic construals of that distinction as a dichotomy. A full
reply to Metz’s worries about my appeal to ineffability as the source of ultimate
meaning will require some further elaboration of this thought.
In my book (Bennett-Hunter 2014, ch. 5), I provide a supplementary reading of the
rational status of Cooper’s argument for ineffability, guided by the recent work of Iain
McGilchrist (2009, ch. 4). In order to be rational, an argument has to presuppose the
validity of the subject–object distinction. But what is the rational status of an argument
which concludes to a concept that shipwrecks that distinction? Briefly, my answer is
that the argument makes initial use of reason in order rationally to demonstrate both
reason’s limitations and the necessity of a form of discourse that is not wholly rational
(like Cooper’s ‘rhetorics’ and ‘poetries’), which is unconditioned by the subject–object
distinction and whereby the ineffable may therefore be evoked. This argument presents
us with a picture of reason as being like a ladder, which, once climbed (and only then),
must be kicked away (cf. Wittgenstein 1988, §6.54). It is a rational argument that defends
a phenomenological perspective, from which the world ‘reason’ no longer signifies
anything specific that is wholly distinct from what is signified by the word ‘passion’,
for example. From this phenomenological perspective there seems little point in speaking
3 See n. 1, above. This existential phenomenological conception of meaning is set out, inter alia, by the early
Heidegger (1962, 116).
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of a ‘purely rational’ dimension to human existence. From this perspective, there is a
palpable demand for a kind of philosophical discourse which, in line with the phenomena
in which experienced reality consists, inextricably includes what are often abstractly
separated as ‘rational’, ‘evaluative’, and ‘affective’ dimensions.
In my view, reflection on the rational status of Cooper’s argument for ineffability
reveals something important about the nature of existential phenomenology: that, as a
philosophical method with a tendency to dissolve dualisms (Cooper 1999, ch. 5), it
incorporates both a rational and a descriptive/poetic pole, effecting a dialectic between
them. (I call this the ‘phenomenological dialectic’ (Bennett-Hunter 2014, 123–131)).
Cooper’s argument begins with a rational approach, which assumes the validity of the
subject–object distinction, but that argument concludes to a concept (that of ineffability)
that eludes further meaningful articulation in the rational terms of that distinction.
Cooper (2005, 137) is clear that, to avoid an incoherent neo-Kantian perspective, the
appeal to ineffability involves a feat of ‘double exposure’, which simultaneously reveals
human Life as both that to which meanings ultimately answer and, if it is itself to be
experienced as meaningful (answerable or measurable), as the coming to presence of the
ineffable beyond the human. This human world is revealed by such a double exposure as
‘not simply a human world unthinkable in isolation from us, but at the same time a
realization of, a coming forth of, something to which we can strive to answer and
measure up’ (Cooper 2009, 58). It is here that the rational terms in which Cooper’s
argument is initially presented begin to give way. He ends his 2005 article on ‘Life and
Meaning’ with the following words, which perhaps read like an understatement:
The delicacy of performing this feat of ‘double exposure’ should not be in
question. So it is not very surprising, perhaps, that I find myself drawn, in my
two claims, to speak in ways that are difficult simultaneously to combine.
(Cooper 2005, 137)
Pace Sartre, it would be philosophically irresponsible to indulge in the descriptive
poeticising for which this argument calls before reason’s limitations have been
established on rational grounds (Bennett-Hunter 2014, 107–11). The ladder must be
climbed before it can be kicked away. At its best, as McGilchrist observes, existential
phenomenology does not consist in an arbitrary preference for, and turn towards,
experience over logic. Phenomenology begins with the conventional philosophical
tools: clarity of thought and expression, a striving towards precision, consistency, and
cogency of argument. At its best, it represents the distinctive philosophical impulse to
transcend the usual, purely rational scope of philosophical inquiry. Its rational pole
(literalistic, explicit, and analytical) is complemented by its descriptive and poetic pole,
which pays attention to reality precisely as it is experienced. As Jaspers (1956, 113–7)
and McGilchrist (2009, 140) point out in their lucid readings of some of the famous
pre-Socratic paradoxes, such description could not be carried out in purely rational
terms without contradiction. Perhaps appropriately, McGilchrist (2009, 135) describes
the distinctive philosophical impulse, found in phenomenology and pragmatism, to
transcend the demesne of the purely rational with the aid of a bizarre simile:
Admittedly, trying to achieve it at all using the conventional tools of philosophy
would be a bit like trying to fly using a submarine, all the while making ingenious
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adaptations to the design to enable one to get a foot or two above the water. The
odds against success would be huge, but the attempt alone would be indicative
that there was something compelling beyond the normal terms of reference, that
forced one to make the attempt.
It is in these terms that I explain the tendency of some existential phenomenologists to
speak of an ultimate ‘source’ of the human world, or a ‘mystery’ to which it answers (see,
e.g., Marcel 1948). These philosophers are striving towards a source of ultimate meaning
for the human world, a terminus of explanations of the meaning of Life, which, for that
very reason, cannot be exhaustively captured in the rational terms in which all philosophy
quite properly begins. And it will be clear why I think it unsurprising that some of these
writers find religious or quasi-religious significance in this idea. Philosophers impossibly
committed to rationality (by which I mean a particular understanding of reason that
presupposes a dualistic distinction between subject and object and which thereby leaves
open the possibility of reason’s in principle unlimited operation in isolation from other
forms of human engagement with the world (Bennett-Hunter 2014, 112)) will complain
that the descriptive and poetic discourse in which phenomenology often results is simply
not philosophy. But, if my reading of the rational status of Cooper’s argument is well
taken, the phenomenologist must reply that it is what philosophy, even as these philo-
sophical opponents understand it, necessarily becomes. It is the consummation of
philosophy, when philosophy takes reason as its guiding light in the absence of any
other, when it follows through the implications of its own logical operations. Itself still
philosophy, it is no longer mere rationality but has become the consummation of reason.
On the other hand, it would be easy to draw the mistaken conclusion that because
existential phenomenology is often poetic and challenges the idea that reason has an
exhaustive scope, it does not itself involve reason. The phenomenologist must answer
that her method does involve reason, but only to the limited extent that reason itself
permits. It does so to the extent, firstly, that within the terms of the subject–object
distinction, it may defend its own methodology in opposition to rationality’s dichotomy
between subject and object and, secondly, that it might show that its own consummation
in a poetry of attunement to the ineffable takes place, not as an arbitrary substitute to
reason but only with reason’s shipwreck. As a more or less explicit intuition, this central
thought is present as an abiding theme in Karl Jaspers’s (1956, 119) philosophy:4
That the whole of my rationality rests upon the basis of non-reason—such a
phrase does not assert that reason can be denied out of some general right drawn
from existential philosophy. Nothing which lacks reason or which is contrary to
reason can raise up argumentative claims out of itself, for precisely this process
enters into the medium of rationality.… Every premise of justification enters into
the medium of the rational. The truth of the non-rational is impossible unless
reason is pushed to its limit.
One of Metz’s concerns is that the concept of ineffability cannot terminate the chain
of questioning regarding meaning and that, even if we assume that it can, we could
never know whether our lives were answerable to the ineffable or not. His concern is
4 Similar themes are present in Wittgenstein’s later work, which I discuss in the final section.
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that ‘my inability to refer to (or know) the relevant object’ would prevent me from
explaining the meaning of Life in terms of it, describing my view of the human
condition as ‘like being in an unavoidably dark room and told to attune myself to the
work of art on the wall’ (Metz 2016, 000). In Kantian terms, my suggestion looks to
Metz like an instruction to comprehend an appearance by appealing to the thing-in-
itself. My reply to the worry concerning reference is to repeat the point that, although
one cannot refer to the ineffable, one can evoke the ineffable by referring to the concept
of ineffability: for me, the ineffable is not an object at all and, as Metz observes, is a
reality toward which we can only gesture. Therefore the language of ‘measure’, to
which Metz (2016, 000) objects, must be understood in non-literal terms. Unlike some
recent writers on ineffability (Jonas 2016, 121–127), my view is that there can be
irreducibly metaphorical, or otherwise non-literal, forms of language. But these forms
of language, which gather at the descriptive, poetic pole of phenomenology are only
licensed once the literal, rational forms have been exhausted by being pushed to their
limits. So, as I have been suggesting, although the validity of the concept of ineffability
can be rationally demonstrated, its content (or rather its contentlessness) cannot be
further articulated in purely cognitive, rational terms. It is the shipwreck of the subject–
object distinction that licenses the construal of attunement to the ineffable as a process
of cipher-reading, a transformed attitude of attunement towards our human world itself
that can be both evoked and cultivated in arational, poetic terms. With Jaspers, who
writes of our ‘imprisonment’ in appearance, I, too, write about the ‘phenomenality’ of
the human world, but deny that there is any determinate noumenal ‘object’ with which
the phenomenal might be contrasted. Jaspers (1969a, vol. 1, 82) describes the intellec-
tual movement of transcending as one that ‘leaves the world but does not lead out of the
world to something else’; its meaning is derived from the boundary concept, not from
an object (to which it would be possible to secure reference), nor from an alternative
world of objects. Therefore, in my view, the ineffable is not best evoked as being like a
work of art on the wall of an unavoidably dark room but rather as being like rays of
light which potentially illuminate all phenomena and allow them to be experienced in
new ways, but those rays of light have no objective, (‘noumenal’) source beyond that
human world itself. For this reason, I am sympathetic to Cooper’s (2002, 327 cf. 2006,
ch. 7) language of ‘epiphanies’ of the ineffable; he points out that the phrase ‘epiphany
of…’ is more akin to ‘flash of lighting’ than ‘flash of a knife’, i.e., an expression ‘where
it would obviously be mistaken to imagine a divide between what shows and its
showing’. When attuned to the ineffable measure of the human world, when answer-
able to the ineffable, my experience is of what Jaspers calls the ‘physiognomy’ of
existence. So in answer to Metz’s question how I could ever know that my Life was
answerable to the ineffable, I give Jaspers’s (1969a, vol. 3, 134) reply: that this is ‘not
like the bad physiognomy aimed a form of knowledge, with inferences drawn, from
signs, on something underneath; it is like the true physiognomy whose Bknowledge^ is
all in the viewing’. In other words, the question is rendered illegitimate by the
shipwreck of the subject–object distinction, after which narrow, cognitive interpreta-
tions of the nature and significance of the experience are manifestly inappropriate.
Another concern that Metz raises is with my view that meaning is exclusively
relational. Could we not rather say that ‘while some meaning can accrue in virtue of
properties intrinsic to a person, more meaning would accrue insofar as those properties
were to relate to broader contexts’ (Metz 2016, 000)? In Metz’s view, apparently,
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meaning is a ‘thick’ concept: when one explains something’s meaning, one will be able
to appeal to objective properties of that thing in virtue of which it is to be judged
meaningful. My problem with this owes to my existential phenomenological perspec-
tive, according to which meaning is not a thick concept but something more like the
‘thickness’ of concepts: the condition for the application of concepts and for the carving
up of lived experience into subjects (which apply concepts) and objects (to which
concepts are applied). To be sure, we can appeal to objective features of, say, flour (its
propensity to rise when baked) in order to explain a meaning that it has in human Life
(an essential ingredient of bread). But to an unascertainable extent those objective
features owe to the subjective interests, perspectives, and practices that have led us
human beings to carve the world of experience up in the way that we have in the first
place (e.g., bread, its ingredients, and their respective roles in our lives). I agree with
Putnam’s neo-pragmatist expression of this point: ‘A being with no values would have
no facts either.’ (Putnam, cited in Pihlström 1996, 274).
I am even less sanguine about the feasibility of the conception of meaning as a
thick concept in the context of explanations of the meaning of Life as a whole.
For, in that case, pointing to certain objective features of Life itself could be
sufficient for an explanation (a partial one, at least) of its meaning; in other words,
Life would have at least some inherent meaning. In his recent book, James
Tartaglia (2016, 43) compares life to a game of chess and the idea that life has
meaning (construed as a relation to something beyond itself) to the possibility of
achieving checkmate, which may motivate a person’s moves in the game. But
Tartaglia believes that checkmate is an unavailable illusion: there is nothing
beyond life in terms of which its meaning could be explained. Therefore, he
counsels us to focus instead on the moves in the game themselves. Having
discovered that these are, in fact, ‘the only real goals’, we must value them ‘for
their own sake’. In other words, the only kind of meaning that we will be able to
find for Life will be inherent in Life itself. In my view, however, the unavailability
of checkmate would undermine the meaning of the moves in the game of chess,
which have no ‘inherent meaning’ for which they might be valued ‘for their own sake’:
their meaning just consists in their contribution to the possibility of checkmate. My view
is supported by the fact that Tartaglia’s book is, in fact, an argument for nihilism: his
main conclusion is not that Life is partially meaningful, but that, given the absence of a
transcendent context of meaning, Life, together with the whole of reality, is wholly
meaningless. If Tartaglia really believed that there were such a thing as ‘inherent
meaning’ that it were possible to find within human Life, he would have reached a
different conclusion (see Bennett-Hunter 2016a).
But while I cannot commit to the letter of Metz’s alternative proposal, I am
sympathetic to the spirit: that in one, importantly qualified, sense, Life itself is what
ultimately supplies meaning. Metz (2016, 000) concludes with the suggestion that
‘[s]eeking meaning Ball the way down^ could lead to a spade being turned upon the
earthly, the comprehensible, the finite’. I have no quarrel with this conclusion but, in
the light of Jaspers’s remarks on cipher-reading, I want to add that the quest for ultimate
meaning requires an ability to experience the finite in a new way, with a transparency to
the ineffable reality with which, in the appropriate mode of attunement, the finite world
is experienced as being wholly intimate. However, it will be clear from my previous
remarks that this concession can be made only after the subject–object distinction has
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been tested to its limits. Once again, the ladder has to be climbed before it can be kicked
away.
3.2 Reply to Professor Cooper
Professor Cooper’s response article sensitively reflects on music, nature, and their
relationship to support my suggestion that art (and religious rituals) may cultivate a
sense of ineffability, ‘body it forth’, and enable it to do the kind of work in human life
that I have been describing. Both art and ritual have their strengths and weaknesses in
carrying out this important role. Works of art often seem disconnected from the rest of
human life, sealed off from its quotidian realities, bounded by frames, locked up and
carefully guarded in museums and galleries. But they are less often subject to the same
kind of dogmatism that is attendant upon many religious rituals. No doubt there are
‘dogmatic’ curators and art critics but thankfully such people do not have the kind of
finely-grained control over the lives of ordinary people that is wielded by some
religious leaders. Conversely, the dangerous potential for dogmatism notwithstanding,
religious rituals are typically much more imbricated with the fabric of people’s lives
than most works of art. As John Cottingham (2003, 98) points out, the repetitive,
rhythmic pattern of daily ritual practices, like saying morning and evening prayer and
grace before meals, allows the otherwise mundane rhythm of eating and sleeping to
take on a religious significance. The shape of a life as a whole, too, may be religiously
structured, in some traditions, by the ritual structure of the liturgical year and, perhaps
universally, by the marking off of significant life events by rites of passage: birth by
baptism, copulation by marriage, and death by cremation or burial. One of the
advantages of Cooper’s stress, in his response article, on the ‘complete resistance’ to
a separation between the natural and the cultural is that it allows for a more intimate
connection between works of art and the rest of life. Cooper’s (2006) remarks on
gardens (neither wholly ‘art’ nor wholly ‘nature’) as places where such opposites can
be reconciled and ‘epiphanies’ of a life attuned to the ineffable can be experienced point
in this direction. Also relevant is the ritual significance that some gardens, notably Zen
gardens, have (Cooper 2006, 118). Similarly, his remarks on the creative, intimate, and
mutually informing relationships between music like John Cage’s and the ‘ambient
sounds’ of the rest of life, including the natural world, suggest the exciting possibility
that at least some works of art invite the kind of experience that attends to a more
intimate relationship with the natural environment and with the rest of life. The exciting
possibility opened up by Cooper’s (2016, 000) remarks is for some aesthetic experi-
ences to be atypically ‘skilful means’ of attunement to the ineffable.
One of Cooper’s (2016, 000) concerns is with my claim that works of art are
ineffable because their meaning is inexhaustible; ‘it sounds strange’, he writes, ‘to
regard this as a reason for calling the work Bineffable^. Usually, we think of
something as ineffable because description of it can never begin, not because it
can never end.’ My reply to this objection is that, in my view, works of art do not
describe but rather evoke the ineffable. To return to phenomenology’s rational and
poetic poles, while rational discussion of the ineffable can never start, its poetic
evocation can never stop. This is because, as we heard Jaspers insisting, no human
imagining of the ineffable could ever be exhaustive or definitive. However, I
concede Cooper’s (2016, 000) point that it ‘cannot be for this reason, or in this
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sense, that art works, which are describable, are ineffable’. What is ineffable is the
meaning of the work: the ‘real presences’ that, for Merleau-Ponty (1964, 162) and
George Steiner, the artist embodies in her work, effecting ‘transbstantiations’ of
the ineffable into pigment or some other artistic medium (Bennett-Hunter 2014,
147–8).5
In his response article, Cooper helpfully emphasizes the broad nature of my concept
of experience. This, too, is attributable to the shipwreck of the subject–object distinc-
tion on the concept of ineffability. Drawing here on some of Cooper’s (1985) earlier
work, as well as Jaspers’s account of ciphers, I find the distinction between experience’s
subjective and objective dimensions to be signally unhelpful in this demesne. After the
rejection of ontotheology, religious experiences of the ineffable are not of any ‘object’
at all, neither can they be understood in purely cognitive terms. My concept of
experience is one that does not require the application of concepts (which would entail
that the ineffable could not, by definition, be experienced) nor, as I explained earlier, a
dualistic distinction between its subjective and objective dimensions. This is why I
prefer Jaspers’s theory of ciphers to theories of religious symbols. Ciphers are irreduc-
ible to either pole of the subject–object distinction; their purpose is to enable us to
transcend the distinction. Jaspers (1969b, 93–94) writes:
Ciphers are objective: in them something is heard that comes to meet man.
Ciphers are subjective: man creates them by his way of apprehending, his way
of thinking, his powers of conception. In the subject–object dichotomy [Spaltung]
ciphers are subjective and objective at once.
Finally, in the limited space available, Cooper is reluctant to go into detail about
‘[w]hat, exactly, a life is like that is led in a manner answerable to a sense of mystery’
but the foregoing remarks suggest, in harmony with Metz’s view about what gives Life
meaning, that it would, at the very least, involve renewed attention to the quotidian
fabric of that Life itself. While no literary portrait could, by definition, be definitive,
Hugo von Hofmannsthal’s (2005) ‘The Lord Chandos Letter’may be a helpful place to
start. As Cooper’s response article stresses, I have argued that art may be understood as
a powerful means of cultivating such answerability and a rich source of ciphers—as
may linguistic and non-linguistic religious practices, when the cipher is read in the
responsible, philosophical way that Jaspers prescribed. Recall that, while Jaspers
(1969a, vol. 3, 131) rejects the idea that any system could be a definitive system of
ciphers, he allows that ‘a system can itself be a cipher’. In my view, religious systems
should be viewed, like works of art, as ciphers of the ineffable.
Jaspers was hopeful that, if religious experience and expression were ‘melted
down’ into a process of cipher-reading and the ‘poison’ of exclusive claims
removed from religious discourse, philosophy and theology would be on the path
to reunification. I share Karl Jaspers’s sense of hope and conclude this article with
some suitably tentative remarks on the direction that future work towards such
reunification might take.
5 For this quasi-religious, ‘sacramental’ line of thought in Merleau-Ponty, see Kearney (2010). For the notion
of ‘real presences’, see Steiner (1989, 1996).
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4 The Future of Ineffability: Remarks on Further Research in Philosophy
of Religion
In this article, I have presented my reading of Cooper’s argument for ineffability as a
rational argument that demonstrates reason’s limitations and reveals phenomenology as
a philosophical method, with rational and poetic poles, which enables philosophy’s,
usually purely rational, self-imposed limits to be transcended. I compared this argument
with a ladder, which, once it has been ascended, must be kicked away. But while the
reader might accept the idea that there may be a point at the top of the ladder, where, on
pain of irrationality, reason must be abandoned, they may be wondering about the
foundations of reason. How solid is the material into which the bottom of the ladder is
sunk? Wittgenstein’s (1969) last work, On Certainty (which was never prepared or
sanctioned for publication by Wittgenstein himself), sheds some light on this question.
For Wittgenstein (as is well known), there are ‘hinges’ on which any epistemic evalu-
ation must turn. If rational inquiry is to get off the ground at all, certain propositions have
to be assumed and taken for granted. Following the non-epistemic reading offered by
Duncan Pritchard (2012), these hinge commitments, which Wittgenstein describes as
having the character of indubitable certainty, are essentially arational. Just as one cannot
rationally doubt a hinge proposition, one cannot rationally believe it either (Pritchard
2012, 257). To have arational hinge commitments, for Wittgenstein, is just what it is to
be rational. This Wittgensteinian picture of the structure of reasons as ultimately
groundless may provide further support, from a different philosophical angle, for
Jaspers’s remark, which I approvingly quoted earlier, that ‘the whole of my rationality
rests upon the basis of non-reason’. Perhaps, having ascended and kicked away the
ladder, we discover from Wittgenstein that it had always been floating in mid-air.
Prichard (2000, 2011, 2015) suggests that Wittgenstein’s late epistemology is relevant
to philosophy of religion, and should be applied to it in the form of a position called
‘Wittgensteinian Quasi-Fideism’. I have discussed this suggestion and its implications
elsewhere (Bennett-Hunter forthcoming), voicing the reservation that Pritchard’s specifi-
cation of the theistic proposition ‘God exists’ as the distinctive ‘hinge proposition of
religious belief’ is unduly restrictive. The added complexities of Prichard’s Wittgenstein-
ian Quasi-Fideism notwithstanding,6 Wittgenstein (1969, §§94, 156, 233, 262) suggests,
in several passages, that there is a necessary commonality to people’s hinge commitments,
and that a set of such commitments is integral to a whole shared picture of the world,
against which rational disagreements take place. It is problematic for Wittgensteinian
Quasi-Fideism that ‘God exists’ is not a proposition that adherents to non-theistic religions
could accept, less still secular atheists. Even within the Christian tradition, as we have
seen, straightforward denials of the existence of God and insistence that talk of God’s
existence is ineluctably non-literal have been part of Christian theology since the ancient
6 For example, Pritchard (2012, 267–268) distinguishes between hinge commitments and an ‘Über-hinge
commitment’, which allows him to account for apparent hinge disagreements without conceding the existence
of hinge disagreements. Since hinge commitments just codify the Über-hinge commitment, he interprets
apparent hinge disagreements as second-order disagreements about which specific propositions should be
included in the set of propositions that are taken to codify the general, shared Über-hinge commitment. When
one inquires whether Wittgensteinian Quasi-Fideism is true (i.e., whether there are religious hinge proposi-
tions), this is the very point at issue, for one is asking whether or not some religious proposition(s) should be
included in the set of specific propositions that are taken to codify the Über-hinge commitment.
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world of Pseudo-Dionysius. Clearly the involvement of a commitment to theism is not a
sufficient condition for an intellectual position to count as a religious one.
I advance the alternative proposal that, if there is at least one religious hinge
proposition, it will have to be one on which both theists and atheists could agree. To
return to my theme, I venture the thought that such propositions refer to experiences of
ineffability, the possibility and occurrence of which are conceded even by the most
vocal atheists. Yet, although they can be interpreted in secular terms, such experiences
are also often interpreted in a religious light, both theistic and non-theistic (Bennett-
Hunter forthcoming). This inclusive proposal would repay further development and
evaluation by philosophers of religion, for it is the path that Jaspers saw as necessary
for the hoped-for reunification of theology with philosophy, which has been in question
since Tertullian. Moreover, it has already received initial support, from a quite different
philosophical perspective, in the form of Silvia Jonas’s (2016, 184) recent suggestion
that ‘Self-acquaintance’ could serve as a ‘minimal metaphysics’ of religious ineffability
on which both the theist and the atheist could agree. One thing is certain, however: the
future of theology as a philosophically credible epistemic practice will depend, at the
very least, on a willingness to engage in conversation with non-theistic traditions.
It will be most important for philosophers of religion to pursue these lines of thought,
which suggest that some important discussions between theists and atheists have been cut
short prematurely. For we may find that such continuing conversations have the power to
transform the character of the interreligious encounter (which is often also intercultural
encounter) in ways that the contemporary world urgently needs. It will be clear from the
foregoing article how I think that the philosophical appeal to ineffability, with its implied
critique of ontotheology, can guard the human experience of what Jaspers called ‘Tran-
scendence or God’ from dogmatically religious, and otherwise superstitious,
misinterpretations. It can perhaps therefore achieve what even as prominent an atheist
as the late Christopher Hitchens (2010) acknowledged to be the great cultural task of the
future. With Karl Jaspers, I am hopeful about the valuable future contribution of philos-
ophy to this great cultural task: its ability to remove the poison of exclusive, dogmatic
religious claims, to enable religious experience to be melted down into the reading of a
cipher, and thereby to clear the overgrown path between Athens and Jerusalem.
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